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subscriptions to clients.  These include the Revista Jurídica de la Universidad 
de Puerto Rico, our hosts for this conference, Revista Jurídica de la 
Universidad Interamericana, Revista del Colegio de Abogados or the “Bar 
Association” and Ley y Foro, also from the Colegio de Abogados.   
For both countries that we cover and for all materials that we offer, one of our 
most important responsibilities for best serving our clients is to keep abreast 
of developments in the book trade, literary trends and current events in Puerto 
Rico and the Dominican Republic.  This includes maintaining a solid 
knowledge of each country’s history, politics, literature and culture. 
The Caribbean Court of Justice: A New Judicial 
Experience 
 
 
 
DÉSIRÉE P. BERNARD 
 
 The Honorable Madam Justice Desiree Bernard is the first female judge of the 
Caribbean Court of Justice.  She received the honor of the eighth CARICOM 
Triennial Award for Women.  A lawyer by profession, she began her career in 1963 
when she attained a Bachelor of Laws Degree from the University of London.  By 
1964 she was a qualified Solicitor and practiced in the Guyana Law Courts until 
1980, when she was appointed the first female judge in the High Court of the 
Supreme Court of Guyana, where she had practiced since 1965.  
In 1992, she was appointed the first female Justice of Appeal in the Court of 
Appeal of the Supreme Court of Guyana; in 1996, the first female Chief Justice; in 
2001, the first female Chancellor of the Judiciary of Guyana and the Caribbean and in 
2005, the first female Judge of the Caribbean Court of Justice.  
She has served as a member of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the International Association of 
Women Judges and as Vice President of the International Federation of Women 
Lawyers.  Regionally - a member of the Caribbean Council of Legal Education, 
President of the Organization of the Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Associations.  
She has been at the forefront in the formation of the Caribbean Women’s 
Association, the Georgetown Toastmistress Club, the Conference on the Affairs and 
Status of Women in Guyana (CASWIG), Guyana Consumer’s Association and the 
Guyana Association of Women Lawyers.  Her nine awards, include the Medal of 
Service from the Caribbean Women’s Association and the Order of Roraima of 
Guyana, the second highest national award of Guyana and now, the 2005 CARICOM 
Triennial Award for Women.  
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Background
The inauguration of the Caribbean Court of Justice in April 2005 
represented the culmination of aspirations in earlier years to establish a court 
of last resort for the Caribbean Region to replace the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council (The Privy Council) which was and still is for most 
Commonwealth Caribbean jurisdictions, the final court.  These aspirations 
were endorsed by the legal profession through the Organisation of 
Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Associations (OCCBA) over thirty years ago, 
although the idea of such a court was not an original one having been 
contemplated early in the last century.  The court was envisaged as a 
Caribbean Court of Appeal with an appellate jurisdiction hearing appeals 
from domestic appellate courts and an original jurisdiction to interpret 
regional treaties. 
The year 1973 saw the emergence and adoption of the Treaty 
Establishing the Caribbean Community and Common Market, familiarly 
known as the Treaty of Chaguaramas.1  A report from the West Indian 
Commission established in 1989 by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
Heads of Government and comprising eminent persons of the Region 
recommended widening of the Caribbean Community and developing a 
Single Market and Economy (CSME) as well as the establishment of a 
Caribbean Supreme Court with an original jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes 
among Member States pertaining to the economic integration together with  
an appellate jurisdiction hearing appeals from domestic appellate courts. The 
acceptance of these recommendations led to the signing of the Revised Treaty 
of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including the 
CARICOM Single Market and Economy (The Treaty)2, and provision for the 
establishment of a Caribbean Court of Justice (The Court).  The Agreement 
Establishing the Court (The Agreement) preceded the Treaty3 and provided 
for both an original and an appellate jurisdiction4.   
 
1 Signed at Chaguaramas, Trinidad and Tobago, on 4 July, 1973. 
2 Signed at Nassau, The Bahamas, on 5 July, 2001. 
3 Came into force on 14 February, 2001. 
4 Article  of the Agreement. 
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Judicial Systems of CARICOM Member States 
One of the legacies of British colonialism bequeathed to its former 
colonies is the judicial system based in its entirety in most instances on the 
English system with the same hierarchy of courts and their nomenclature.  
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England was and still remains 
for all, except two5 of those former British Caribbean colonies, the court of 
final resort for appeals from domestic appellate courts.  Although the common 
law of England became the common law of these former colonies and 
essentially remains so, there are some exceptions, for example, the Roman-
Dutch system of land ownership in Guyana, and the French Civil Code of St. 
Lucia, which has resulted in a “legal mix” of common law and civil law. 
 Suriname’s membership of CARICOM with its civil law system 
exemplifies the diversity of the Community which over time may, at some 
future date include Cuba; prophetically the complexities which may arise will 
test the capabilities of the Court to deal with such a diversity of legal systems. 
Suriname’s Court of Justice at present remains its court of last resort. 
Agreement Establishing the Court  
The existence of a regional court, specifically with an appellate 
jurisdiction, is nothing new for the former British colonies of the Caribbean 
Region6. The achievement of independent status by the colonies led to the 
establishment of their own appellate courts, but with retention of the Privy 
Council as the final court of appeal.   The Agreement Establishing the Court 
which preceded the signing of the Treaty represented the conviction of the 
Contracting Parties that the Court would have “a determinative role in the 
further development of Caribbean jurisprudence through the judicial 
process” and would be entrenched in their national constitutions; moreover, 
 
5 Barbados and Guyana. 
6 See the Federal Supreme Court of 1950’s, the British Caribbean Court of 
Appeal of 1960’s and the present Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court with both 
original and appellate jurisdictions comprising Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, British 
Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines. 
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they were well aware that “the establishment of the Court was a further step 
in the deepening of the regional integration process.”7 
Appellate Jurisdiction
In this jurisdiction the Court operates as a court of last resort for those 
Member States accepting it as such, and being structurally placed at the end of 
the litigation process.  The conceptualisers of the Court sought to fulfil two 
dreams for the Caribbean Region by uniting them in one judicial system – the 
long-sought need for a final appellate court to replace the Privy Council, a 
respected tribunal of colonial memory, and the establishment of an 
international court to ensure effective implementation of the Treaty. 
 In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction the Court is a superior 
court of record with such jurisdiction and powers as are conferred on it by the 
Agreement.8  Appeals lie to the Court as of right from final decisions of the 
courts of appeal of the Contracting Parties in the following cases: 
(a) in civil proceedings where the matter in 
dispute is of the value of not less than 
$25,000E.C. or where the appeal involves 
property or a right of the said value; 
(b) in proceedings for dissolution or nullity of 
marriage; 
(c) in any civil or other proceedings which 
involve a question as to the interpretation of 
the constitution of the Contracting Party; 
(d) in proceedings relating to redress for 
contravention of the provisions of the 
constitution of the Contracting Party; 
(e) in proceedings relating to the exercise of a 
jurisdiction conferred expressly on a superior 
court under the constitution of the 
Contracting Party; 
(f) such other cases as may be prescribed by any 
law of the Contracting Party. 
Subject to the above, an appeal also lies to the Court with special 
leave of the Court in any civil or criminal matter.  Apart from appeals to the 
 
7 Preamble to the Agreement. 
8 Article XXV. 
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Court as of right an appeal can be brought with leave from the court of appeal 
of a Contracting Party in final decisions in any civil proceedings where, in the 
opinion of the court of appeal, the question involved in the appeal is one of 
great general or public importance or otherwise ought to be submitted to the 
Court; also, in other cases as may be prescribed by any law of the Contracting 
Party. 
What is more than passing strange in relation to the appellate 
jurisdiction is that although the Agreement was signed by nearly all of the 
Member States of the Community, only two of those States (Barbados and 
Guyana) have enacted the required domestic legislation to accord access to 
the Court by their nationals.  Since its inauguration these two States have been 
utilising the Court to its fullest.  The inhibiting factor in relation to the other 
States is the requirement in some constitutions for a referendum to de-link 
from the English Privy Council and hesitancy in having this done or the need 
for involvement of opposition political parties in enacting relevant legislation, 
but which in some instances is not forthcoming at present. One can only hope 
that over time these hurdles will be surmounted, and all of the Member States 
will make the appellate jurisdiction accessible to their nationals. 
The following sentiments expressed by Professor Francis Jacobs in the 
Journal of International Economic Law published on 14 February, 20089 are 
instructive: 
“A supreme court of high calibre has been 
established in the Caribbean which would be 
able to take account of local values and 
develop a modern Caribbean jurisprudence 
in an international context. It is regrettable 
that political difficulties have obstructed 
acceptance of its jurisdiction and that the 
outdated jurisdiction of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council survives, in 
often bizarre detail, for many of those States.
All possible steps should be taken to 
encourage the Caribbean States to accept the 
jurisdiction of their own supreme court.” 
 
9 Extracted from Professor Jacobs’ book, “The Sovereignty of Law: the European 
Way (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2007.  Professor Jacobs is Professor 
of Law, King’s College, London, and former Advocate General of the European 
Court of Justice. 
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Original Jurisdiction
The provisions of the Agreement governing the original jurisdiction 
of the Court are replicated in the Treaty in almost identical terms, 
exemplifying a synergetic relationship.  Because of this, reference will be 
made to similar articles in both instruments when considering the relevant 
provisions. 
My learned colleague and friend, Hon. Mr. Justice Duke Pollard, in 
his book, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: CLOSING THE CIRCLE OF 
INDEPENDENCE, posited that “the Court is perceived as the institutional 
centrepiece of the CSME which aspires to the creation of a single economic 
space superimposed on autonomous political jurisdictions in order to 
approximate in fact, if not in law, a single economy from the economies of 
many Member States.”   
In its original jurisdiction the Agreement, subject to the Treaty, 
confers on the Court exclusive jurisdiction to hear and deliver judgment on: 
(a) disputes between Contracting Parties; 
(b) disputes between any Contracting Parties and 
the  Community; 
(c) referrals from national courts or tribunals of 
Contracting Parties; 
(d)  applications by nationals concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Treaty.10 
The Court’s exclusive jurisdiction also embraces delivery of advisory 
opinions concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty given 
only at the request of Member States parties to a dispute or the Community.11 
Both instruments recognise the sovereignty of the dualist Member 
States of the Community, and a natural consequence of this is that each 
Member State could interpret and apply the Treaty as it sees fit.  Of necessity, 
this would lead to varied interpretations and differences of opinion.  With the 
establishment of the Court certainty and uniformity of interpretation of the 
terms of the Treaty are guaranteed, thereby avoiding fragmentation if left to 
individual domestic courts. It is beyond dispute that certainty of an important 
international instrument, such as the Treaty, is a sine qua non in attracting 
 
10 Article XII of the Agreement, Article 211 of the Treaty. 
11 Article XIII of the Agreement, Article 212 of the Treaty. 
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investment to the Region, and it follows that uncertainty and unpredictability 
of judicial decisions on economic issues will become a disincentive to 
potential investors.  
As a consequence when a national court or tribunal is seised of an 
issue involving interpretation or application of the Treaty, and which is 
necessary to enable it to deliver judgment, that court or tribunal must refer the 
question of such interpretation or application to the Court for determination;12 
this is the sole prerogative of the Court.  Similar provisions are to be found in 
the instruments of the European Union, and were intended as those in our 
Treaty, to secure uniformity.  It is expected that this provision will have a 
significant impact on the work of the Court with the referral procedure being 
utilised by domestic courts when faced with matters requiring interpretation 
of the Treaty. 
It would be a futile exercise and totally meaningless to the parties 
involved if Member States, the organs and bodies of the Community as well 
as the Community itself were to ignore or refuse to comply with judgments of 
the Court, and for this reason both instruments provide that the Court’s 
judgments must be complied with promptly by Member States and entities of 
the Community as well as any persons to whom a judgment applies.13 
The original jurisdiction of the Court is recognised as being 
compulsory, ipso facto, and without special agreement14, an important 
provision if the Court is to execute its functions effectively. 
Being essential for the successful operation of the CSME whose birth 
reflected a “commitment to deepen regional economic integration in order to 
achieve sustained economic development based on international 
competitiveness”, with objectives similar to the European Union, the Court as 
an international court is empowered under both instruments to apply such 
rules of international law as may be applicable, and may not decline to make a 
finding on the ground of obscurity of the law.  However, these provisions will 
not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a dispute ex aequo et bono if 
the parties so agree.15 
 
12 Article XIV of the Agreement, Article 214 of the Treaty. 
13 Article XV of the Agreement, Article 215 of the Treaty. 
14 Article XVI of the Agreement, Article 216 of the Treaty. 
15 Article XVII of the Agreement; Article 217 of the Treaty. 
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Much reliance will be placed and assistance gleaned from 
international tribunals such as the European Court of Justice and the Court of 
Justice of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa which are 
courts established with a similar function to interpret and apply the relevant 
instruments.   
After proceedings are instituted before the Court either between 
Member States or between a national and another Member State, a third party 
may wish to intervene to protect an interest.  In this regard the Agreement 
permits intervention if the intended intervener, whether Member State, the 
Community or a person, establishes that it has a substantial interest of a legal 
nature which may be affected by a decision of the Court.16 
If circumstances arise after a judgment of the Court has been handed 
down and which may adversely affect the parties, a request for the judgment 
to be revised can be made.  Such a request may be considered by the Court if 
an application is made within six months of the discovery of a fact which was 
not known at the date of the judgment and which may have been a decisive 
factor provided such an application is made not more than five years from the 
date of judgment.17 
Queries have often been raised about the Court’s powers in enforcing 
its judgments.  Enforcement of judgments of domestic courts is usually 
provided for by legislation of the particular state.  In like manner Contracting 
Parties (Member States) agree to take all necessary steps, including the 
enactment of legislation, to ensure that all authorities in the State act in aid of 
the Court, and that any judgment or order of the Court be enforced by all 
courts and authorities of a Contracting Party in the same way as any judgment 
or order of a superior domestic court of that State.18 This provision applies to 
both jurisdictions of the Court as does Article III of the Agreement which 
provides that the decisions of the Court shall be final. 
The perception of the average Caribbean citizen is that the Treaty 
came into being mainly for the regulation of trade and maintaining a sound 
economic environment for Member States, and only incidentally for the 
benefit of individuals.   Nothing could be further from the truth.  There are 
several provisions in the Treaty which have a direct bearing on the every day 
life of persons in the Caribbean Region, for example, the movement of skilled 
 
16 Article XVIII; there is no similar provision in the Treaty. 
17 Article XX of the Agreement, Article 219 of the Treaty. 
18 Article XXVI of the Agreement. 
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persons and of nationals without harassment, as well as the elimination of the 
requirement for passports, to name a few19.  This is an important aspect of the 
Court’s jurisdiction and provision is made for hearing and determining 
disputes involving persons or legal entities (such as companies) of a 
Contracting Party concerning interpretation or application of the Treaty.20  It 
can only be invoked with special leave of the Court if it determines that the 
Treaty intended that a right or benefit conferred on a Contracting Party was to 
enure to the benefit of the persons or entities directly.  In its application to the 
Court the persons or entities have to establish that they have been prejudiced 
in respect of the enjoyment of the right or benefit, and that the Contracting 
Party who is entitled to espouse the claim has omitted or declined to do so or 
has expressly agreed to the persons or entities doing so in its stead.  The Court 
ultimately has to find that the interest of justice requires that the persons or 
entities be allowed to espouse the claim.  The Court in its first case in the 
original jurisdiction is at present in the process of determining issues in 
relation to this provision of the Treaty in proceedings between two companies 
and a Member State.  
 In any court binding judicial precedent is desirable (the doctrine of 
stare decisis) if stability and predictability are to be maintained particularly in 
a court entrusted with the jurisdiction of interpretation of a treaty essential for 
the successful operation of a single market and economy aimed at attracting 
investment.  Both the Agreement and the Treaty provide that judgments of the 
Court shall be legally binding precedents for parties in proceedings before it21 
taking into account revision of a judgment.  It is acceptable that judgments of 
the Court should be legally binding precedents for parties involved in 
proceedings before the Court; what is yet to be decided by the Court is 
whether it will consider itself bound by its own decisions. The Privy Council 
has never regarded itself bound by its own decisions which sometimes have 
led to inconsistency and unpredictability particularly when the liberty of 
persons is involved.  It is too early to forecast what course the Court will take 
having been in existence for a relatively short period of time with appeals in 
its appellate jurisdiction coming from only two Member States, and only now 
beginning to hear matters in its original jurisdiction.  
 One of the concerns of the Community reflected in the Treaty was 
that “the benefits expected from the establishment of the CSME were not 
 
19 Article 46. 
20 Article XXIV of the Agreement, Article 222 of the Treaty. 
21 Article XXII of the Agreement; Article 221 of the Treaty. 
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frustrated by anti-competitive business conduct”.22 To avoid and monitor such 
practices provision is made for the establishment of a regional competition 
commission to be appointed by the Regional Judicial and Legal Services 
Commission23 (functions of which will be discussed later).  In carrying out its 
duties the Competition Commission may seek the Court’s intervention when 
necessary, and any party aggrieved by a determination of the Commission 
may apply to the Court for a review of that determination.24  
Anti-competitive business conduct may be prohibited by a Member 
State, and examples of such conduct are enumerated in the Treaty,25 such as 
the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or the artificial 
dividing up of markets or restriction of supply sources.  Of course, the list is 
not exhaustive, and where a Member State is uncertain whether a particular 
business conduct is prohibited under the Treaty, the State may apply to the 
Commission for a ruling on the matter.  The Court’s jurisdiction may also be 
invoked by the Commission to review its own decision if it is found or felt 
that such a decision was induced by deceit or improper means.26 
 Notwithstanding the compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction accorded 
to the Court to hear and determine disputes between Member States 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty, elaborate 
provisions are stipulated in the Treaty for the settlement of disputes without 
recourse to the Court27, for example, where allegations arise that an actual or 
proposed measure of a Member State is or would be inconsistent with the 
objectives of the Community or there are allegations that the purpose or 
object of the Treaty is being frustrated or prejudiced.  A perusal of the 
relevant articles of the Treaty suggests that every effort should be made and 
all procedures exhausted in settling disputes between Member States and 
between organs and bodies of the Community before the jurisdiction of the 
Court is invoked in contentious proceedings.  Alternative disputes settlements 
are to be encouraged by Member States to the maximum extent possible in 
relation to private commercial disputes among Community nationals as well 
as among Community nationals and nationals of third States.28  The 
Agreement also enjoins Contracting Parties to do the same.29 This being so, 
 
22 Preamble to the Treaty. 
23 Article 172. 
24 Article 175. 
25 Article 171. 
26 Article 180. 
27 Articles 187 – 210. 
28  Article 223. 
29 Article XXIII. 
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proceedings instituted by private persons and entities may be the vehicle to 
drive the Court forward in making an impact as “the institutional centrepiece 
of the CSME.”  
Judgments of the Court 
Since its inauguration in April 2005, and until very recently the 
Court’s judgments have been handed down exclusively in its appellate 
jurisdiction in mainly civil matters with a few criminal and family law 
appeals.  To date over forty (40) matters have been filed in the Court, with 
only two in the original jurisdiction.  Within the appellate jurisdiction several 
applications for special leave to appeal as a poor person were granted.  These 
applications vindicate the establishment of the Court as providing access to 
justice to those who cannot afford the expense of legal representation to the 
Privy Council located thousands of miles away from the Region; similarly the 
frequent use of audio-conferencing which further reduces travelling costs to 
litigants.  Following are a few of the Court’s judgments. 
The landmark judgment of the Court in Attorney General of Barbados 
v Joseph & Boyce defined the Court’s jurisprudence on the effect of an 
unincorporated human rights treaty ratified by the Executive on the 
international plane and sought to be enforced on the domestic plane in death 
penalty cases.30 Several other issues fell to be determined with judgments 
written by all of the judges of the Court.  This case was the first major test of 
the Court on the deeply-sensitive issue of the death penalty particularly as it 
was perceived within the Caribbean Region and predicted to be a “hanging 
court,” based on the false assumption that the judges would comply with the 
wishes of the political directorate who in some instances had been dissatisfied 
with judgments of the Privy Council allowing appeals of persons convicted of 
murder.   
Following is a short summary of the facts of the case. Two men were 
convicted of the offence of murder by the courts in Barbados, and exhausted 
all of their remedies up to the Privy Council.  Death warrants were read to 
them by decision of the local Privy Council (a committee on the prerogative 
of mercy) while awaiting hearing of their petitions to the Inter American 
Commission on Human Rights based on Barbados’ ratification of the Inter 
American Convention on Human Rights which had not been incorporated into 
the domestic law by legislation. The condemned men sought unsuccessfully to 
postpone their executions by instituting proceedings in the High Court, and 
 
30 (2006) 69 WIR 106. 
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later appealed to the local Court of Appeal which commuted their sentences to 
life imprisonment. The Attorney General appealed to the Caribbean Court of 
Justice.   
As mentioned earlier several other issues arose which time does not 
permit to mention, but with regard to the effect of unincorporated 
international treaties on a condemned person’s right to the protection of the 
law, the Court held that the respondents had a legitimate expectation that they 
would be allowed a reasonable time within which to complete the process 
initiated by petitioning the Inter American Commission on Human Rights, 
and for the State to attempt to execute them before that process was 
completed was a denial of their right to the protection of the law.  Legitimate 
expectation, simpliciter, was expressed to be procedural and vulnerable to 
frustration by a change of official conduct according to one of the judges who 
posited that international acts by the Executive must be accompanied by 
“treaty-compliant” conduct on the municipal plane in dualist jurisdictions in 
order to engender such an expectation to which municipal courts may accord 
protection.  The conduct in this case regarded as being compliant with the 
treaty was the Barbados Government’s stated position that it was its practice 
to permit condemned persons an opportunity to have petitions to international 
human rights bodies processed before execution of their sentences in keeping 
with its commitment to honour its international obligations. This was the main 
factor giving rise to a legitimate expectation, and one queries whether, absent 
such conduct, an unincorporated treaty ratified by the Executive on the 
international plane can provide an effective remedy for a national on the 
domestic plane. 
What makes this issue in the judgment interesting is the judgment of 
one of the judges from a civil law jurisdiction with its monist approach to the 
incorporation of international treaties into domestic law.  He opined that the 
strongest concept underlying the doctrine of unenforceability of ratified 
treaties was the separation of powers, and expressed the view that although 
this may be sufficient reason for the existence of the doctrine in the unwritten 
English Constitution it was unsuitable for the Commonwealth Caribbean with 
written Constitutions. An in-depth analysis of the judgments is recommended 
to appreciate the advantages of diversity of opinion in the Court’s quest to 
create a Caribbean jurisprudence. 
Another appeal of interest is the case of The Queen v Mitchell Ken 
O’Neal Lewis31 concerned primarily with issues of procedure under Section 
 
31 (2007) 79 WIR, 75. 
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6(c) of the Caribbean Court of Justice Act of Barbados.  The Section provides 
for an appeal to lie to the Court from decisions of the court of appeal as of 
right in any civil or criminal proceedings which involve a question as to the 
interpretation of the Constitution.  The preliminary issue which fell to be 
determined was whether the Crown can appeal as of right to the Court by 
virtue of Section 6(c).  This arose in circumstances where an accused was 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death.  On appeal to the court of appeal 
the conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered on the ground that 
prejudicial material had been introduced in the presence of the jury and this 
rendered the trial unfair.  The Crown through the Director of Public 
Prosecutions submitted that the court of appeal’s conclusion was based on an 
erroneous interpretation of the “fair hearing” provision in the Constitution of 
Barbados which is the usual provision found in all constitutions based on the 
Westminster model – a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial court, and for this reason the Crown had an appeal 
as of right to the Court.   
All of the judges of the Court agreed that the right of appeal created 
by Section 6(c) of the Caribbean Court of Justice Act of Barbados is available 
to the Crown provided that the case involves a question concerning the 
interpretation of the Constitution, and the question whether in this case the 
accused received a fair hearing was a question not of interpretation of the 
relevant section of the Constitution, but of the application of it to the facts, 
and accordingly the Crown was not entitled in this case to appeal as of right to 
the Court.  The appeal was dismissed, but the order for a retrial was left intact. 
One of the judges delivered a judgment on the susceptibility of the 
term “fair hearing” to judicial interpretation, which has the effect of 
enhancing the rich pool of judicial opinions available from the Court. 
The whole concept of adverse possession of immovable property was 
discussed in the recent Guyanese appeal of Toolsie Persaud Ltd v Andrew 
James Investments Ltd and Others32 which concerned certain lands originally 
owned by two of the respondents, but compulsorily acquired by the 
Government of Guyana and later sold to the appellant who went into 
possession under the agreement of sale.  Several years later upon a 
constitutional motion filed in court by the first respondent the compulsory 
acquisition orders were declared null and void.  The appellant company while 
still in possession of the lands later applied to the court for prescriptive title.  
Three issues arose for consideration – (a) did the State have the necessary 
 
32 CCJ Appeal No. CV 1 of 2007. 
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intention for its possession to be adverse when that possession was based on 
the belief that it was the owner under a compulsory acquisition order 
subsequently declared to be invalid, (b) was it possible for the State to acquire 
land by adverse possession, and (c) did a landowner’s right of action to 
recover land acquired from him by the State under an invalid compulsory 
acquisition order only arise when the order was declared to be invalid by a 
court upon a constitutional motion brought by the landowner? 
In relation to (a) the Court held that physical occupation and use of 
land with the intention and effect of excluding everyone else, amounts to 
adverse possession, whether the occupier acts in good faith believing himself 
to be the owner, or in bad faith knowing that someone else is the owner.  With 
regard to (b) the Court held that a landowner’s constitutional right to prevent 
the State from positively taking his land from him against his will, was 
completely consistent with a landowner losing his title if for twelve years he 
failed to take any action against someone who was occupying his land and 
excluding him from it.  In answer to (c) the Court held that a landowner’s 
right of action to recover his land arises as soon as he can bring an action in 
which he can claim recovery of title and possession; thereafter time runs 
against him.  Passing of possession from the State to the appellant was 
seamless, and possession pursuant to a contractual right could be added to the 
State’s earlier adverse possession. 
 As mentioned earlier in this presentation Guyana’s law of immovable 
property is based in large measure on the Roman-Dutch system of land 
ownership, and this arose for consideration in a recent appeal from the Court 
of Appeal of Guyana in the case of Harrinauth Ramdass v Salim Jairam and 
Others33 which originated from an agreement of sale of land between the 
appellant and his sister, who was deceased at the date of hearing of an action 
brought by the appellant against her.  After the appellant entered into 
possession of the land in accordance with the agreement, the sister sold and 
passed title for a portion of land to another purchaser at a higher price.  The 
appellant filed proceedings against the vendor and the new purchaser for 
specific performance of the agreement and revocation of the title of the 
purchaser. 
 The appellant alleged in his pleadings that the vendor and the 
purchaser had conspired to defraud him of the property, but gave no 
particulars of the alleged fraud and the allegation was later withdrawn.  
However, he sought to persuade the court that he acquired an equitable 
 
33 CCJ Appeal No. CV 3 of 2006. 
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interest in the land. The trial judge held that equitable interests in immovable 
property are not recognized in Guyana, and refused the order for specific 
performance as well as the claim for the revocation of the purchaser’s title. 
 An appeal to the Court of Appeal of Guyana was dismissed.  In an 
appeal to the Caribbean Court of Justice the main issue concerned the ongoing 
debate of whether equitable interests in land in Guyana are recognized or can 
be acquired having regard to the development of the law of immovable 
property in Guyana inherited from the Roman Dutch system, particularly in 
relation to a purchaser who is put in possession under an agreement of sale.  
The majority view reflected in Guyanese cases and the independent analysis 
of the Court indicate an acceptance of the conclusion that equitable interests 
in land are not recognized in Guyana although statutory provisions permit the 
application of equitable remedies.  Accordingly the appellant acquired no 
equitable interest in the land purchased from his sister.  He, however, was 
entitled to seek from her an order for specific performance of the agreement 
of sale which in fact he sought, but only after she had passed title to the other 
purchaser who acquired an indefeasible title subject only to a possibility of it 
being declared void for fraud which was abandoned at the hearing of the 
action in the lower court. 
 In relation to the grant of leave to appeal as a poor person the case of 
Elizabeth Ross v Coreen Sinclair34 exemplifies the Court’s efforts to afford 
access to justice by all.  Leave to appeal as a poor person had been refused by 
the Court of Appeal of Guyana, and the applicant was ordered to lodge 
security for costs in the sum of $100,000G within ninety (90) days failing 
which the appeal would stand dismissed.  She sought leave from the CCJ to 
appeal as a poor person being blind and virtually penniless.  The case 
involved ownership of a condominium in which she had resided for several 
years as a tenant of a deceased resident, but owned by a housing authority.  
The administratrix of the deceased resident, the respondent, was in no better 
financial position.  The appeal involved issues about the rightful owner of the 
condominium, and which the Court considered had reasonable prospects of 
success. 
 However, the main issue centred around the procedural point of 
whether the Court could grant leave to appeal as a poor person when such 
leave had been refused by the Court of Appeal which under the Appellate 
Jurisdiction Rules of the CCJ was the court empowered to grant such leave; 
this would have the effect of reversing the decision of the court below and the 
 
34 CCJ Appeal No. CV 13 of 2007. 
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appearance of the Court sitting as a court of review.  The Rules make no 
provision for this.  After hearing arguments both written and oral from 
Counsel for the parties who appeared pro bono, the Court granted leave to the 
applicant to appeal as a poor person by utilising Rule 1.3 of the CCJ Rules 
which defines the overriding objective as being “to enable the Court to deal 
with cases fairly and expeditiously so as to ensure a just result.”  The 
reasoning was that the fact that the Rules conferred on the court of appeal the 
power to grant leave to appeal as a poor person, does not mean that a refusal 
of such leave disables the Court, if it considers that the interest of justice so 
requires, from making an order of its own granting such leave, particularly if 
the appeal is considered to have merit.35 
As stated earlier two cases have been filed recently in the original 
jurisdiction, and are in the process of hearing.   It is hoped that now that the 
ice has been broken there will be a steady flow particularly from natural and 
juridical persons within the Region. 
Administration  
(a) Appointment of Judges 
The unique feature of the Court is not confined only to its peculiar 
dual jurisdiction.  Being an international court with jurisdiction to apply and 
interpret a Treaty subscribed to by Member States of an economic union, one 
would expect that appointment of the judges of the Court would be influenced 
by the Member States who may field candidates for appointment either in an 
individual capacity or as representing a State.  This form of judicial 
appointment to international courts and tribunals is frequently the norm, for 
example, appointments to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on which 
member states of the European Union are represented, the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), and other international tribunals appointments to which are 
made by the United Nations states parties.  In contrast the judges of the 
Caribbean Court are appointed by a Regional Judicial and Legal Services 
Commission (RJLSC)36 comprising representatives of regional bar 
associations, civil society and academic institutions, totally independent of 
political influence and of which the President of the Court is the Chairman.  
The establishment of this Commission sought to allay deep-seated fears (real 
or perceived) within the Caribbean Region about political interference in the 
 
35 The full texts of all of the judgments can be accessed by visiting the Court’s 
website at www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org. 
36 Article V of the Agreement. 
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judgments of the Court due to some alleged unfortunate instances of 
perceived interference within the domestic courts of the Region. 
In a recent work titled THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE, the authors37 
expressed the view that “in general one cannot apply to become an 
international judge,”38 and that “national governments have total control over 
who will be put forward for an international judicial position and who will 
not.”39   To avoid such a situation the appointment procedure for the Court 
involved advertisements in the media and online, which attracted applications 
both from the Caribbean Region and the international community. Interviews 
followed and short lists compiled from which the final six judges were 
selected with no consideration being given to equitable geographical 
distribution; judges were chosen solely for their individual expertise. 
Incidentally two of the judges appointed do not belong to any CARICOM 
Member State. The Agreement provides for the composition of the Court to 
be the President and nine other judges.40 
 The judges of the Court are chosen and appointed solely by the 
Commission.  The Agreement provides for the appointment of the President 
to be made by the qualified majority vote of three-quarters of the Contracting 
Parties.41  However, this can only be done on an affirmative recommendation 
of the Commission. 
 Criteria for appointment as a judge of the Court laid down in the 
Agreement include judicial experience for a period of not less than five years 
in a common law or civil law jurisdiction or engagement in the practice or 
teaching of law for a period of not less than fifteen years.  Regard will also be 
had to high moral character, intellectual and analytical ability, sound 
judgment, integrity and understanding of people and society.42  With such 
criteria the judges of Court will be assessed ultimately by the quality of the 
judgments emanating from the Court. 
 
37 Daniel Terris, Cesare P.R. Romano, Leigh Swigart, Brandeis University Press 
2007. 
38 The footnote to this was that a notable exception is the Caribbean Court of 
Justice; whether or not governments put forward suggestions for candidates, it should 
be noted that the CCJ has recently accepted applications from all interested parties 
regardless of origin. 
39 Terris, et. al, supra. 
40 Article IV. 
41 Article IV(6). 
42 Article IV(II). 
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(b) Tenure of Office of the Judges 
The majority of judges serving on international courts do so for 
specified term limits, seven or nine years, and because they are elected they 
can be re-elected for a further specified term. In relation to the Court the 
Agreement provides for length of tenure tied to the attainment of a fixed age 
of retirement rather than a term limit.  The Agreement stipulates a retirement 
age of seventy-two years43 with a discretion recently given to the RJLSC to 
grant an extension of an additional three years upon request and if the services 
of the judge are deemed necessary for the work of the Court. The President is 
mandated to serve as President for a non-renewable term of seven years. 
Concerns have surfaced that the judges of the Court do not enjoy the 
same security of tenure as judges of domestic courts whose appointments are 
entrenched in the domestic constitutions of Member States; in fact this issue 
was litigated in the Jamaican courts all the way to the Privy Council44 which 
held that the judges of the Court did not enjoy the same security of tenure 
under the Constitution as the judges of the higher Jamaican domestic court, 
and deemed the legislation which sought to implement the Court to be 
unconstitutional.  To ensure security of tenure of the judges of the Court 
Member States must honour not only the undertaking enshrined in the Treaty 
to employ their best endeavours in completing the constitutional and 
legislative procedures required for their participation in establishing the 
Court,45 but also the desirability of entrenching the Court in their national 
constitutions in accordance with the Preamble to the Agreement; to this one 
may add entrenchment on the same terms as the judges of their domestic 
courts. 
With regard to removal of a judge from office, this can only be 
achieved by inability to perform the functions of the office, whether due to 
illness or for misbehaviour, with a procedure for such removal being invoked 
by the RJLSC.46  Accountability of the holders of judicial office is essential in 
inspiring public confidence, and in this regard self-regulation of judicial 
conduct must be a priority.  To ensure this a code of judicial conduct has been 
formulated.  
 
43 Article IX. 
44 Independent  Jamaica Council for Human Rights Ltd –v- Hon. Syringa 
Marshall-Burnett & Attorney General of Jamaica (2005) PC 3; 65 WIR 268. 
45 Article 224. 
46 Article IX of the Agreement. 
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(c) Financial Provisions 
One incidence of judicial independence is that the judiciary 
considered to be the third branch of a State, must be provided with sufficient 
and sustainable funding by the other two branches – the Executive and the 
Legislature – for the performance of its functions to the highest standards.  
This is one of the Guidelines for preserving judicial independence reflected 
in the COMMONWEALTH PRINCIPLES ON THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF AND THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT.47  In this 
regard the expenses associated with the Court including maintenance of the 
seat of the Court (based in Trinidad and Tobago) under the Agreement are to 
be borne by the Contracting Parties.48 
Based on past experiences of States’ tardiness in honouring regional 
financial commitments and in order to guarantee the Court some measure of 
financial autonomy from regional governments, a Trust Fund was created by 
the Member States with capital of US$100 million which was raised through 
international financial markets by the Caribbean Development Bank.  The 
said sum was transferred to a Board of Trustees of reputable persons with the 
requisite skills who are responsible for its management and disbursement to 
the administrators of the Court for its management.  It was lent to the Member 
States at low rates of interest and repayable over a period of fifteen to twenty 
years. 
This arrangement for financing an international court has been 
commended by experts knowledgeable about the operations of international 
courts.  It is certainly a novel arrangement, and again another feature of the 
Court’s uniqueness. 
Potential Issues for the Court’s Determination 
With the birth of the CSME in 2001 the Court in its original 
jurisdiction was regarded as being essential for its successful operation. To 
date only the “Single Market” aspect has been implemented with the 
“Economy” being deferred to some opportune future date.  In the present 
dispensation Member States resolve “to establish conditions to facilitate 
access by their nationals to the collective resources of the Region on a non-
 
47 Agreed by Law Ministers and endorsed by the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting, Abuja, Nigeria, 2003. 
48 Article XXVIII of the Agreement. 
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discriminatory basis,”49 and which is reflected in the Treaty.50 It provides that 
“within the scope of application of the Treaty and without prejudice to any 
special provisions . . .,   any discrimination on grounds of nationality only 
shall be prohibited.”51 
I posit that this Article of the Treaty is fundamental to the success of 
the Single Market involving as it does persons (natural and juridical) of the 
Region.  It is the people of the Region from the collective Member States who 
will ensure success; divisiveness will ensure failure. In this regard the Court’s 
role will be pivotal in resolving issues that will inevitably arise among 
nationals of one Member State residing or employed in another Member State 
amid allegations of perceived discrimination. Being cognisant of the tendency 
of nationals of one Member State to view those born in another Member State 
as foreigners, it is expected that allegations of discriminatory treatment will 
lead to recourse to the Court for an interpretation of the Treaty. 
 Another aspect of the Treaty with which the Court will have to 
grapple is the prohibition of new restrictions by Member States relating to 
the right of establishment of nationals of other Member States except as 
otherwise provided in the Treaty.52  The right of establishment within the 
meaning of that part of the Treaty includes the right to engage in any non-
wage-earning activities of a commercial, industrial, agricultural, professional 
or artisanal nature, or to create and manage economic enterprises which 
include any type of organisation for the production of or trade in goods or the 
provision of services.  Again, because of the same perceptions of nationals of 
one Member State against others, the Court will play a decisive role in 
determining issues concerning the right of establishment. 
Laudably, Member States undertake to “take all appropriate 
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the carrying out of 
obligations arising out of the Treaty or resulting from decisions taken by the 
Organs and Bodies of the Community,” and to “facilitate the objectives of the 
Community” as well as “abstain from any measures which could jeopardise 
the attainment of the Treaty.”53  The question arises – will the Court ever be 
called upon to interpret or apply this important provision of the Treaty?  
Maybe, the answer lies in the hands of the peoples of the Caribbean Region.
 
49 Preamble to the Treaty. 
50 Article 7. 
51 Id. 
52  Article 32. 
53 Article 9. 
